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PER CURIAM. 
 
         Appellant, Miklos Homoki, sued Northampton County 
(Pennsylvania), the warden of the county prison, and the chief 
record officer of the prison under 28 U.S.C.  1983, alleging that  
defendants confined him to the prison for some months beyond the 
expiration of his sentence on state drug convictions.  He asserted 
violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, giving 
rise to two causes of action:  first, a claim for false 
imprisonment, denial of due process, and cruel and unusual 
punishment, and, second, a claim for failure of the individual 
defendants to release him because the county failed to properly 
train and supervise them.   
         The district court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment in an order that discusses only the Eighth Amendment claim 
but analyzes the case as a whole.  The court noted that under 
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989), a prisoner 
incarcerated past the expiration of his sentence has a cause of 
action under  1983 for deprivation of Eighth Amendment rights.  
The court concluded, however, that Homoki did not state a claim 
under  1983 because the defendants had not subjected or caused him 
to be subjected to incarceration beyond the expiration of his 
sentence; rather, by refusing to accept parole he suffered from a 
self-inflicted deprivation consisting of continued incarceration.  
         It is not necessary that we explore all the details of 
Homoki's relevant case histories.  He pleaded guilty to two 
informations charging possession of methamphetamine and heroin and 
was given suspended sentences and probation.  He violated probation 
by possession of cocaine, and the suspended sentences were 
reimposed.  He was separately sentenced for the cocaine offense 
that had led to the revocation of probation.  On appeal of the 
sentence imposed for violation of probation the sentence was 
vacated for a new probation revocation hearing.  On remand the new 
hearing was conducted on April 24, 1992, and Homoki was resentenced 
for the methamphetamine/heroin convictions.  During his subsequent 
incarceration Homoki protested several times that he was entitled 
to release. 
         In July 1992 Homoki was referred to parole officials for 
interview.  There is evidence that he then stated he did not wish 
to be on parole because he feared his parole officer would report 
him as a parole violator and cause him to be sent back to 
confinement.  Therefore, he wished to serve his sentence of 
confinement until its expiration and then be unconditionally 
released.  Homoki also says that he stated at the time of his 
interview that his sentence of confinement already had expired and 
accordingly he then refused parole on principle.   
         The case could not be decided on the basis set out by the 
district court.  Before it can be determined whether, by state 
action, Homoki was improperly incarcerated beyond the expiration of 
his sentence[s] of confinement, or as a consequence of his own 
action he remained confined because he declined to accept the 
status and conditions of parole, there must be a determination of 
the date on which his sentence[s] of confinement expired and of the 
terms and conditions of parole.  Also there appears to be an issue  
of whether Homoki has received proper credit for time served. 
         The district court noted that Homoki contended that he 
was entitled to release on August 14, 1992, at the expiration of 
his sentence for cocaine possession.  The court held: 
         Homoki argues and the Court agrees that the 
         actionable period began on August 14, 1992, 
         the expiration of the [sic] Judge Simpson's 
         sentence for cocaine possession, and continued 
         until Homoki was released until March 24, 
         1993. 
   
We are unclear whether the reference to "the actionable period" was 
intended to be a finding of fact that Homoki's period of 
incarceration was to terminate August 14, 1992 or is merely 
descriptive language describing the period August 14, 1992 - March 
24, 1993 as the period for which Homoki contends he was illegally 
incarcerated.  On appeal, Homoki appears to say that August 14 was 
the latest date his confinement expired.  He refers, however, to 
other possible, and earlier, dates springing from credit for time 
served, and indeed he advances one argument that he was entitled to 
immediate release the moment he was resentenced on April 24, 1992.  
In this court the defendants have not addressed the issue of when 
sentence[s] of confinement expired but rather stand on the judge's 
conclusion that Homoki was not incarcerated by state action but of 
his own volition because he refused parole. 
         There must also be a determination of Homoki's parole 
status when his sentence[s] of confinement expired, whenever that 
was.  For such use as it may be to the district court, it seems to 
us that there are several possibilities respecting parole, 
including the following.  First, when Homoki's confinement time 
expired he was entitled to unconditional release on that date, free 
of conditions of parole.  Second, on the expiration date he was 
conditionally entitled to release, i.e., release on condition he 
would move to parole status.  A third possibility is that on 
termination of confinement a period of parole was mandated by state 
law or by the sentence[s] imposed.  Fourth, Homoki contends that 
the imposition of parole was beyond the authority of the sentencing 
judge and within only the power of the Board of Parole.   
         The district court relied upon Crenshaw v. Parratt, 698 
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1983), for its self-inflicted wound rationale.  
But in that case the inmate was scheduled for mandatory 
consideration for parole by the state Board of Parole, under a 
state statute requiring such consideration, prior to expiration of 
the minimum term of confinement.  He declined to agree to uniform 
conditions of parole and refused to appear before the parole board.  
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the inmate had a liberty 
interest but held that he was not deprived of anything because he 
was not entitled to release free of parole.  He simply frustrated 
the process that might have given him early release on parole.  In 
contrast, Homoki contends that his period of confinement expired 
and that, under the terms of the sentence imposed upon him, he was 
entitled to unconditional release on August 14 (or earlier) but was 
held for months thereafter.   
         The district court found that Homoki was actually offered 
parole in his July interview.  If this is correct and his term of 
confinement had not expired and he was offered early release on 
parole, he is like the inmate in Crenshaw, who could not frustrate 
early release and then complain because he was not released; Homoki 
would be in that status only for the period extending to the time 
he was entitled to unconditional release, i.e., a refusal of early 
release on parole could not extend his term of confinement beyond 
a date prescribed for unconditional release.   
         For consideration of the threshold questions we have 
noted Homoki contends that relevant sources include a colloquy by 
the judge at the April 24 resentencing and an opinion entered by 
the judge some two months later after the contours of the sentence 
were questioned.  Also Homoki refers to the content of the court's 
sentencing record (the "sentencing sheet") entered at the 
resentencing, which he says disagrees with the colloquy, and a 
related matter of whether the sentencing sheet was required to be, 
and in fact was, signed by the judge.  It is for the district court 
to determine which of these, and other possible sources, are 
admissible to determine the questions we have set out.  It is also 
for the district court to address on remand, if appropriate, other 
issues not yet reached by it such as the statute of limitations, 
qualified immunity and governmental immunity. 
         We will reverse and remand. 
